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Richard J. McCadden
Co. G, 154th New York
with notes by McCadden
and James W. Bird

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Lakeside, Oregon

CHANCELLORSVILLE

May 2d, 1863

CHAPTER I.

The Armies and Preliminary Movements.

CHANCELLORSVILLE seems to have been a tragedy of errors, and the terrible losses and sacrifices did not result in decided or satisfactory results on either side. The populous and powerful North could easily replace its loss in artillery, in equipment and in men, but with the South, already enfeebled and overstrained, it was far different. The gain in cannon, in prisoners and in morale was great, it is true, but it was fearfully paid for by the victorious army. It may be said, with some truth, that the campaign was Lee's masterpiece in audacity and celerity, but his victory was like that won in ancient times by Pyrrhus, for it was indeed a mortal blow to the vitality of the Army of Northern Virginia. And it may also be affirmed, that when the shot-torn flags of Jackson's Corps were planted in triumph on the crest of Fairview at 9 o'clock on Sunday morning, May 2d, 1863, the culminating point of its daring and strength had passed, never to return. The South could not replace the host of dauntless men who went down in the campaign and desperate struggle.

Both armies moved to the front with great confidence. The Federal army felt secure and strong in its superior numbers, its splendid equipment, its devotion and its enthusiasm. The Confederate army, strengthened by the conscription act, and animated by the long winter's rest, also felt invincible. Moreover, the guidance of its trusty leaders,

R. G. McPadden

implacability. But the reward has been ample, in view of our military history. Why this injustice was wrong in our military history, will be apparent to the student of the Eleventh Corps at the time, and why it has so long uncorrected, will be apparent to the student of our history. Machiavelli well says: "When you discover who is the author of a crime, consider who interest to commit it."

the preparation of these papers, the author has been by a great number of officers and soldiers of both ranks who have shown a laudable desire to ascertain the truth concerning the events occurring on Saturday, May 2d, 1863. To the late Gen. A. B. Underwood, and to Gen. A. Dodge, the first writers of the battle on the side, many thanks are due. To the late Col. W. H. H. Huntington, of Pennsylvania Cavalry; Capt. J. H. Huntington, of the Third Corps, and to many officers and soldiers of the Confederate army. To the writer and the country are due. In fact, with assistance, the narrative could not have been accomplished. Many thanks are due to Gen. James H. Lane; to H. Palmer, of Gen. A. P. Hill's staff; to Col. Kyd and Maj. Jed. Hotchkiss, of Jackson's staff; to Gene Blackford; Capt. Randolph Barton, of the I. Brigade; to Ves Chancellor, and especially to couriers, James M. Talley and Dave Kyle.

AUGUSTUS C. HAMLIN

MAINE, 1866

distance by the Eleventh Corps. Generals Howard, Steinwehr, and Major Howard and Captain Hooker's staff accompanied the troops down to the and some distance beyond. When they returned the been cast, the storm had burst, and the scene was *startle the stoutest heart. The roar of the battle enveloped and destroyed Devens' Division, and the lines of infantry from the depths of the forest two miles in front, indicated that the whole of the force were gathered there for a mighty blow. Barlow three miles away, and Berry and his division, the Chancellor House, in bivouac. Hooker was still porch of the Chancellor House as oblivious of General Buell was at the battle of Perryville, when his tent and did not hear a sound of the conflict which wrecked his army, only two-and-a-half miles distant. Let us review briefly the condition of affairs Eleventh Corps at this time, and see if there is any evidence to show that the situation was understood whether the officers of the exposed corps were neglecting their duty, and whether they are deserving of any sympathy whatever.

*I think a mistake, when Howard
his staff returned he passed with
them nearly feet of me. I felt
was near me and toward road
we captured a whole regiment within
"shot." I think that it must be
about twenty minutes after they
before there was any firing in our
night. First there was a heavy rain
nearly rain that is probably a con-
dark.) a loud cannonading being
but before the rain was half finished
show, the firing was from one side
this while did not continue, but I
my own line and from Howard's

We were probably 150 yards from the
Howell house J. M. Bird 1st Regt Co. S. 154th Regt N. Y. I

ance by the Eleventh Corps. Generals Howard and
Lawler, and Major Howard and Captain Moore,
Walker's staff, accompanied the troops down to the Furnace
some distance beyond. When they returned the net he
cast, the storm had burst, and the scene was enough
to the stoutest heart. The roar of the battle which he
sloped and destroyed Deven's Division, and the yelling
lines of infantry from the depths of the forest extending
miles in front, indicated that the whole of the rebel army
gathered there for a mighty blow. Barlow was the
e miles away, and Berry and his division, the nearest
e in reserve, was over two miles distant in rear of the
ncellor House, in bivouac. Hooker was sitting on the
h of the Chancellor House as oblivious of danger as
eral Buell was at the battle of Perryville, when he lay in
ent and did not hear a sound of the conflict which almost
ked his army, only two-and-a-half miles distant.
Let us review briefly the condition of affairs in the
enth Corps at this time, and see if there is any reliable
ance to show that the situation was understood, and
her the officers of the exposed corps were negligent of
duty, and whether they are deserving of any praise or
pathy whatever.

In a mistake, when Howard and
I returned he found within De
Security feet of me. Right before
I me and Howard saw a light
was a whole regiment without firing
I a bank that it must have been
every minute after they found
the was any firing in our position
was there when a low rumbling
could that in probably a second
bank commenced to roll on our
the time was half past five. The
gunning was from one position
of the rebel army, and followed the

CHAPTER VI.

Warnings of Danger Unheeded.

not known that Jackson was moving past our flank,
to escape or to attack, until Saturday morning;
between midnight of Friday and early Saturday
morning Lieutenant Colonel Carmichael, of the One
and Fifty-seventh New York, was in charge of a
of the picket line. Hearing the sounds of moving
troops in front, he in the morning reported the same
quarters, and was told for his pains that new troops
were being brought up. At ten a. m. some of the officers of
the Brigade, who were keenly on the alert, observed
moving in the southeast and south towards their flank,
led McLean's attention to it. With the aid of the
Hatch, living on the Talley Farm, a diagram was
showing how the rebels could reach their flank by the
they were then pursuing. McLean promised to in-
General Devens, and did so later in the day, and
reported it to Howard, who had noticed it before.
Friend, the officer of the day of Deven's Division,
ed to Devens that a large force of the enemy was
ing to his rear, but Devens refused to give credit to the
Friend then went to the headquarters of the corps,
he was rebuked for his statement, and warned not to
on a panic.
General Schurz, commanding the division in the center,
observed the rebel troops marching from east to west,
being convinced that the flank attack would come,
Captain Dilger, in charge of the battery attached to
division, to look over the territory in rear of the estab-
lishment, which was known as Independent Battery I,
was equally composed of Americans and Germans.

(55)

in which we were at the angle
the rebel army moved from east to
to north and south. near the Donnell
I think that we heard every

x Battery "B" 1st New York

The One Hundred and Nineteenth New York was in which were regarded as among the best troops of the in the Sixty-first Ohio, and Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, them and carrying off in the rush many of the men, especially by the wrecks of Devens' Division rushing wildly the line in front of the Church, but were much disorganized New York and Sixty-eighth New York formed that the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, One Hundred and Ninety the Buschbeck line. Near the Pike, the Sixty-first formed the right of the last position, or what is known, but were forced back into the woods, being flanked ing, but were forced back into the woods, being flanked kept the enemy at bay for some twenty minutes of hard position as guarding the right flank with great obstinacy or more distant. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin held lines on the westerly fields of the Hawkins Farm, half of the infantry at the masses of the enemy adjusting teries some distance in the rear threw its shot over the tery and a part of Weidrick's, and one of the reserve thousand men. Its left flank was protected by Dilger's broken division, and numbered in all, perhaps, about strengthened by some of the soldiers rallied from the Hawkins Farm. This second attempt at resistance Church, to the edge of the woods on the north. tion of the Plank Road and Pike, along in front of the Pike, formed a line of battle extending from below the Sixty-first Ohio and Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, and parts York, Sixty-eighth New York, Eighty-second Ohio their rear, and, with the One Hundred and Nineteenth with resolution, but were forced back towards the w tacked with great energy and the Federal regiments of four powerful Confederate brigades. This line their left, and the three regiments calmly awaited where they made a stand, with the Eighty-second Illinois were ordered back a short distance near the Hawkins far to the north of the Federal position, the two force of the enemy was present, and that their lines

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J. M. Brown

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mean, and under the command of Col. Patrick H. Hooker gave great praise to this brigade for its resistance and it was the only drop of kindness he let fall in his abuse. Warren-Iago like—stated to Congress that made no fight worth mentioning.

Along this line the contest raged for some time. Hooker states that it was an hour, but the actual fighting did not over twenty minutes, probably. The front attacks of the enemy were repulsed, but when both flanks were turned, an enfilading fire from right and left flank reached the cover of the woods in their rear. Buschbeck's four regiments moved slowly back in perfect order, and, in complete control, had in line of battle in the woods to check pursuit, but as he was pressed by the enemy, Buschbeck filed his columns the road and marched slowly towards Chancellorsvillle.

the north side of the rifle pit, several of the regiments Schurz's—the Eighty-second Illinois, Eighty-second Ohio, Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, Fifty-eighth New York, and One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York—retired in order into the woods north of the road, unmolested by the enemy. Dilger, with his single gun, retreated in the road keeping the enemy out of his front by his rapid discharge of canister and solid shot. The two companies of the brigade Irishmen of the Sixty-first Ohio still supported him, besides these there were a number of officers of high rank including both General Howard and General Schurz, who also wished to help the artillerymen who composed the guard of the routed corps.

With the forcing of the Buschbeck line, the impetus the enemy seemed to be broken, as there was no pressing pursuit whatever. Dilger slowly withdrew into the defile keeping the road in front of him free with canister and solid shot, and was virtually the last man in the retreat. Shot after reaching the woods, Dilger ceased firing, as there was no enemy within range to fire at. On the north side of

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** This was the Aug 9th of 1862*



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3d, 1863. The farm consists of but few acres of cleared land, b
there was sufficient territory to enable Stuart to plant the
early Sunday morning thirty or forty cannon, to enflade th
lines of battle on Fairview with a terrific fire, and in a sho
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General Hooker testified before Congress, nearly tw
years after the event, that the bad conduct of the Elevent
Corps lost him the key to his position, and the battle. In
answer to Hooker's remarks, it may be briefly stated th
Hazel Grove was the position lost, and that the Elevent
Corps never were there, nor within a mile of it.

At Hazel Grove, and along the paths leading to it, we
carelessly parked several of the batteries, wagons, and othe
material belonging to the force then at the Furnace unde
Sickles. At seven p. m. everything about Hazel Grove wa
in complete repose. No one seemed to be aware that a se
rious engagement had taken place at the Wilderness Church
two miles distant, and that danger was approaching.

Shortly before this period, Colonel Huey, of the Eigh
Pennsylvania Cavalry, reported to General Pleasanton, who
he found some distance below the Hazel Grove Farm, on th
road to the Wellford Furnace, and not far from it, and the
and there received orders from him to report to Gener
Howard at the Dowdall Tavern. Colonel Huey states th
there was nothing in the language or manner of Gener
Pleasanton, when he gave the order, to lead him to suppo
that a battle was in prospect, or that his services were so
to be required. Huey returned to Hazel Grove, and found
his regiment in bivouac in the field southeast of the Haze
Grove House. He ordered his men to mount their horse
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B. J. McADDEN
Baltimore, Md.

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by them to the rear. It is also strange

...and indistinct to awaken suspicion. The
did not seem to extend far. Sound has
the characteristics, and in certain conditions

...The writer at one time noticed the
Morris Island playing upon Sumter and Wag-
no sounds of the explosions, although the

...than a third of a mile distant, yet the same
after awoke him at Beaufort, fifty miles
of fog signals has also been observed

...with his Confederate division, was waiting to
of Jackson's guns before attacking Hancock
Posey and Wright, with their brigades con-

...to hear definite sounds. Sickles,
Welford Furnace, did not hear a sound of the
the Eleventh Corps, and was not aware

...troops back from the Dowdall Tavern.
after the disappearance of Colonel Huey and
the ammunition train, General Pleasanton-

...Hazel Grove, and the scene rapidly changed.
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Pleasanton at once took command, and in his report to his view:

"I immediately ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry to proceed at a gallop, attack the rebels, and check them until they could get the artillery in position." [In fact the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, with its seventy thousand rounds, had disappeared in the forest some time before.—*Comptroller*.] "This service was splendidly performed by the Eighth, but with heavy loss, and I gained fifteen minutes to bring Martin's Battery into position, reverse a battery of Sickles' Corps, detach some cavalry to stop runaways, secure more guns from the retreating column.

"Every moment was invaluable. Fortunately I succeeded in forcing the enemy's columns showed themselves in the woods, in general and bearing upon the direction the rebels were coming. I supported this force I had two small squadrons of cavalry ready to charge upon any attempt to take the guns. My position was at three hundred and eighty yards from the Plank Road [the actual distance by measurement is sixteen hundred and fifty yards, and as the rebels were on the extreme left of the line of the Eleventh Corps, and as the guns, it was apparent we must soon meet the shock.

"It was now near the dusk of the evening, and in rear of the Eleventh Corps the rebels came on rapidly, but in silence, with their skill and adroitness they often display to gain their object. The only color visible was a Union flag with the center battalion clear up the First New York Cavalry, rode to within one hundred yards of them, when they called out to him, "We are friends, come on," and he was induced to go fifty yards nearer, when their whole line opened with musketry, and commenced advancing. They were the ten rebel battle flags, and dropped the Union color, displayed eight not three hundred yards from the guns, and I gave the command fire. This terrible discharge from twenty-two pieces at that distance staggered them, and threw the heads of their columns back on the woods, from which they opened a tremendous fire of musketry, bringing up fresh forces constantly and striving to advance as fast as they were swept back by our guns. The struggle continued nearly an hour.

"It was now dark, and the enemy's presence could only be ascertained by the dash of their muskets, from which a continuous stream of fire was seen nearly encircling us and gradually extending to our right to cut us off from the army. Finally this was checked by our guns, and the rebels withdrew. Several guns and caissons were recovered from the woods where they fought us."

Story
The above is merely summarizing

...ant on at once took command, and in his report brilliantly and graphically describes what appeared

...Martin, who commanded the Sixth New York ... reports as follows:

...before me was one of indescribable confusion. ... Corps was panic-stricken, and the pack trains, ambulances, ... belonging thereto, were rushing to ... of the cartridges without drivers or teamsters. Not ... and behind this appeared a line of infantry. The ... very vigorous and well maintained. I trust ... Sicks reports of these events thus:

... The fugitives of the Eleventh Corps ... my artillery was parked. The exulting enemy at ... mingled yells with their volleys, and in the confusion ... as if cannon and caissons, dragoons, can- ... infantry could never be disentangled from the mass into ... were suddenly thrown. Fortunately there was only one ... for those panic-stricken hordes, after rushing over ... and this was through a ravine crossed in two ... by the headwaters of Scott's Run. This was soon ... by the reckless crowd choking up the way. A few ... enough to restore comparative order and get our arti-

... enemy showing himself on the plain, Pleasanton met the ... range with the well-directed fire of twenty-two pieces ... woods, from which they opened a furious but ineffectual ... I twice they attempted a flank movement, but the ... by our guns, and the second and most formidable ... rapidly but in perfect order and forming in lines of bri- ... of Whipple and Birney, who were ... in the adequate infantry support which had arrived. ... of our men as twilight closed the combat vainly ... in his entertaining article published in the ... a quarter of a century after the event, reit-

... states that Lieutenant Crosby, with his battery ... U. S. Artillery, was placed on the right of ... battery. Not a gun of this battery nor of the ... was at Hazel Grove, but were at this time ... a mile away.

... estimates the attacking force of the infantry to be ... not arrive until long after ... all fairly had ... your own ... of these ...

and of Regt McCallister furnished the ...

... from the woods where they fought us ... and the rebels withdrew. Several guns and ... us off from the army. Finally this was ... was seen nearly encircling us and gradually ... the flash of their muskets, from which a ... now dark, and the enemy's presence could only be ... back by our guns. The struggle continued nearly ... forces constantly and striving to advance as fast as ... which they opened a tremendous fire of musketry, ... and threw the heads of their columns back on ... terrible discharge from twenty-two pieces at that dis- ... and I gave the command ... and commenced advancing. They were the ... the flags, and dropped the Union color, displayed eight ... to go fifty yards nearer, when their whole ... New York Cavalry, rode to within one hundred yards ... they called out to him, "We are friends, come on," ... doubt created by this flag my aid, Lieutenant Thomp- ... able was a Union flag with the center battalion. ... the rebels came on rapidly, but in silence, with ... now near the dusk of the evening, and in rear of ... apparent we must soon meet the shock.

... immediately ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry ... a gallop, attack the rebels, and check them until ... the artillery in position." [In fact the Eighth Pennsylv- ... with the reserve ammunition mule train of the ... the seventh thousand rounds, had disappeared in ... time before. — *Comber*.] "This service was splendid ... by the Eighth, but with heavy loss, and I gained so ... ies to bring Martin's Battery into position, reverse a ... ies' Corps, detach some cavalry to stop runaways, ... e guns from the retreating column.

... moment was invaluable. Fortunately I succeeded, ... pieces of artillery into position, double spotted with ... earting upon the direction the rebels were coming. ... force I had two small squadrons of cavalry ready ... any attempt to take the guns. My position was ab- ... and eighty yards from the Plank Road [the actual ... asurement is sixteen hundred and fifty yards. — *Comber* ... me left of the line of the Eleventh Corps, and as the ... in the fierce onset of the rebels through and over ... a now near the dusk of the evening, and in rear of ... rps the rebels came on rapidly, but in silence, with ... able was a Union flag with the center battalion. ... doubt created by this flag my aid, Lieutenant Thomp- ... New York Cavalry, rode to within one hundred yards ... they called out to him, "We are friends, come on," ... iced to go fifty yards nearer, when their whole ... musketry, dropped the Union color, displayed eight ... and commenced advancing. They were the ... the flags, and dropped the Union color, displayed eight ... and I gave the command ... terrible discharge from twenty-two pieces at that dis- ... and threw the heads of their columns back on ... which they opened a tremendous fire of musketry, ... forces constantly and striving to advance as fast as ... back by our guns. The struggle continued nearly ... now dark, and the enemy's presence could only be ... the flash of their muskets, from which a ... was seen nearly encircling us and gradually ... us off from the army. Finally this was ... and the rebels withdrew. Several guns and ... from the woods where they fought us ...

five thousand muskets, and that his artillery fire was effective because he applied to it that principle of dynamics which the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection. The discharge fairly swept Jackson's men from the earth. He poured in the canister for about twenty minutes, and the affair was over." He also enlarges upon the stand at Hazel Grove of the Eleventh Corps, and says that "beef cattle, ambulances, mules, artillery wagons and horse became stuck in the mud, and others coming on crushed them down so that when the fight was over the pile of debris in that marsh was many feet high." This statement utterly untrue and extremely unjust. None of the debris was formed by the Eleventh Corps, for their line of retreat was a mile or more directly north.

Pleasanton also says the Eleventh Corps had been camped in the woods two hundred yards distant, whereas the nearest of the left flank of the Eleventh Corps was full one thousand yards, and the right, under Von Gilsa, was more than three thousand yards distant by the nearest path.

Lieutenant Thompson, the aid whom Pleasanton sent to the front to reconnoitre, in 1866 wrote that one man fired at him as he peered into the darkness to find out who were in front of him, and his narrative of how he turned, leading the rebel charge, and how he dodged the discharges of the Federal artillery, forms a very entertaining note in the Scribner series. He also states that the enemy were mowed down in heaps, that the roar of the artillery was continuous, and the execution terrific, etc.

Doubleday, in his work on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, one of the Scribner series of Campaigns of the Civil War, published twenty years after, and regarded as semi-official, relates the story of Keenan and his charge as follows: He states that when Pleasanton arrived at Hazel Grove, he found "all hurrying furiously to the rear."

"There was but one way to delay Jackson; some force must be sacrificed, and Pleasanton ordered Maj. Peter Keenan, commanding the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to charge the ten thousand men in front with his four hundred. Keenan saw in a moment that if

Keenan saw in a moment that if

Furthermore he says: "Had it not been for the guns at Hazel Grove, which held the enemy in check and gallant resistance offered by Huntington's twenty guns at Hazel Grove, this corps too, would have been taken in flank and rear, and would probably have shared the same fate as the Eleventh. It is difficult to estimate the value of the services of the guns at Hazel Grove."

The Comte de Paris, in his interesting work on Civil War, copies Pleasanton's descriptions of his laudable work and also Keenan's cavalry charge. That Pleasanton stops the enemy advancing in good order, and in successive lines; that he dismounts the two guns brought up in attack, and wounds Crutchfield of the Confederate artillery. Neither Crutchfield nor any of his guns were near Hazel Grove that night.

Major Stein, in his late work on the Army of the Potomac, almost thirty years after the event, repeats the romantic story of Keenan's charge, and endorses all of Pleasanton's exploits, and states that the carnage that followed the charge of the double-shotted guns would have blanch-

Major-General J. Watts de Peyster, a brilliant writer of the episodes of the war, lends his aid to immortalize the thrilling scenes, and writes in this manner: "The intricate decision as instantaneous as the electric flash, gathered his cavalry and hurled them upon the foe, until he collected his own rapidly collected guns upon a ridge, and drove them back and saved the army. That this fearful exhibition of heroism to both of which the world can be challenged to produce superiors."

Pleasanton was asked by the Committee of Congress what produced the panic in the Eleventh Corps, and replied: "The combined effect upon their imagination of the soft musketry, and the increasing yells of the rebels and

*This is correct
The gallery report etc
with
J W Peyster
1 Aug 65
copy 028*

*I think Mr
Keenan's
is a fine
P W B*

ermore he says: "Had it not been for the tim-
 at resistance offered by Huntington's twenty
 hazel Grove, which held the enemy in check
 th changed position, this corps too, would
 n in flank and rear, and would probably h
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 orted is due to a feat of generalship and h
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 l the panic in the Eleventh Corps, and replie
 ed effect upon their imagination of the sou
 nd the increasing yells of the rebels and the

89
 EREWALL JACKSON'S FATAL DELAY.
 It was a theatrical effect that Stone-
 id produce better than any other man I have
 the field of battle."
 also informed the committee that he ordered
 he until he gave the word, as he wanted the
 ignense shock. "There was an immense body
 I wanted the whole weight of the metal to check
 when he gave the order "the fire actually swept
 It seemed to blow those men in front clear
 e report reads: "Although a cavalry officer,
 and the artillery with exceeding great judgment and
 His skill, energy, daring and promptness upon
 ion contributed greatly to arrest the disaster which
 me threatened the whole army. His conduct upon
 many other occasions marks him as one of the ablest
 in our service, and as deserving of far higher consid-
 eration from some cause he appears to have received."
 e glowing accounts of military exploits performed at
 ove, as narrated, when compared with the facts or
 appear to be the facts, seem at variance, and far more
 Of a place among the tales of the late Baron Man-
 than the serious and truthful pages of the history
 imes of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia,
 too late for the authors of these false reports to
 ends to the men of the Eleventh Corps, for the most
 e dead; but it is not too late to correct the inscrip-
 history wherein every deserving soldier receives his
 d, no matter whether he carried a musket, with
 uniform, or rode at the head of a column, adorned
 ord and stars. The history of to-day should cover
 with equal fairness, and it should also respect the valor
 of the Confederate soldier.
 may be safely affirmed that none of the fugitives

*Do 5 154 5 1/2 by 1/2
 They find the fact with the rest of the
 J. W. B. of a story*

*The worst event from a military on to left flank
it was in line without any reinforcements.*

of the most comical episodes in the history of the Army. Birney's Division of the Third Corps was one of the bravest in the Federal army, but this midnight adventure, so bravely attempted to fight. None of the First Corps saw Dowdall Tavern, excepting those carried there as prisoners of war. It was two miles or more distant from Buschbeck's line of battle. First Corps was led by Captain Candler, of Hooker's staff. Eleventh Corps, is erroneous. The position to which they were at night, occupied some of the positions abandoned by the First Corps, arriving in the rear. The statement made that the First Corps, arriving in the woods at the foot of the hill where the batteries were placed, four hundred yards in the rear. Birney and his men nor Hill knew before 9.30 P. M. that Berry and his men by the Eleventh Corps, and neither Colston nor Rodes, I mean. Berry did not go within a mile of the positions. Berry and his men causing Jackson's Corps to halt are reports or supports) the evening before. The report of Von Gilsa's Brigade (without entrance overwhelmed Von Gilsa's Brigade) the report in quite as brief a space of time as when Rodes' rebel Third Corps out of its entrenchments without hesitation battle of Fredericksburg, and swept the First Brigade of 3d of May, at seven A. M.; it struck its first blow since attack whatever on May 2d, 1863, but on the morning of the midnight cannonade ceased. Pender's Brigade making of security, and they tried to sleep, and succeeded in The dense woods that intervened gave Pender's men in front of Berry, at the distance of eight hundred Sickles, it may be said that Pender's Brigade was dependent in relation to the attack on Berry, as described did not go within half a mile of it.

where Pleasanton saw the great pile of debris of a column next morning through the swampy place leading to Hagerstown, several officers and men, and retired his horse, Birney lost the flag of one of his best regiments that the stragglers arrested there were not Eleventh

a mile in width, extending from Green's B...
wellth Corps northwest to the Confedera...
s Brigade, on and near the Plank Road...
gap and up its ravine the grand skeddaddl...
n and others have so elegantly described an...
dited to the Eleventh Corps, took plac...
wide gap Williams' Division of the Twelfth...
difficulty in squeezing, on returning from the...
men to pass without attempting to open the...
ad. In fact, his troops finally reached the...
in by this pathway in the ravine, and not a...
pen to the Federal army until sunrise of the...
ay 3d, when Hazel Grove and its approaches...
held by Archer's Brigade of Tennesseans...
face of Lane's and Ramseur's Brigades of...
ans was made on Sunday morning, before...
the vast importance of Archer's capture...
y cannon were placed in battery in the field...
y, which enfladed the Federal batteries and...
rview with a rapid and withering fire, and...
nce of Hardaway's guns, to the south and...
lorsville, rendered the plateau utterly unten...
the fate of the campaign in about an hour...
arm, and the terrific cannonade at the same...
ederal batteries at Fairview, closed the even...
ent. Stuart arrived about this time, and, un...
do in the absence of Hill and Jackson, and...
of his staff but one, commanded rest and...
red Confederates soon sank to sleep, and...
d the oppressive stillness of the evening air...
d songs of the startled whip-poor-wills and...
ids of the Federal troops building barricades...
conflict of the next morning

SUMMARY.

Where the Blame Properly Belongs.

findings of this inquiry show, or seem to show,
that warnings of the massing of the enemy's forces
on the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps were sent
at different times to the headquarters of the First Di-
vision and to the corps, but we have not found any evidence
that they were forwarded to army headquarters at
Chancellorsville. Neither do we find any evidence to show that
General Devens, Howard or Hooker took any measures after
the fact to ascertain if the right flank of the Army of the
Potomac was free from danger. There is, however, abundant
evidence to prove that General Devens, commanding the
right flank, was warned again and again, by several of his
subordinates, of imminent danger from the presence of a large
force of the enemy massing on his flank and rear. But the
commander of the First Division utterly refused to listen to
any positions and the advice of his officers, and even after
the attack was commenced, he declined to allow his regi-
ments to be attacked or threatened in flank and in rear to change
while there was time to change. Furthermore, it ap-
pears that the resistance of this division, placed in such ad-
verse circumstances and overwhelmed by a vastly superior
force, was all that could reasonably be expected of it. To
obtain fifteen minutes longer would have resulted in
the destruction of this division. The hurried retreat of some of the
regiments of the Third Division—Schurz's—then drawn
into battle in the rear to receive the impending at-
tack. Nevertheless, it appears that the rest of the Third
Division with many rallied from the wreck of the First Di-
vision and outflanked by superior numbers. It also

Some of the most marked 2 when the Battery opened

DWB

(125)
Washington of New Orleans
The Battle of Chancellorsville
The Army of the Potomac
The Army of the Potomac
The Army of the Potomac

appears that many of the men of the First (Devens') the Third Divisions (Schurz's) did rally at the unfinished pits of Barlow, and did resist with Buschbeck's Brigade the presence of more than twenty thousand men, until both flanks were turned and retreat or capture was inevitable. also appears that the retreat from this third and last attack was conducted in an orderly manner, and that Buschbeck's Brigade retired in complete order. It seems that there was no active pursuit by the enemy at this time, and that the rear guard, with Diger, and one gun in the road, and Buschbeck's Brigade in battle order, retreated unmolested down the road to Fairview, where Buschbeck's Brigade formed in line of battle in front of the Federal guns, and remained there until Sunday morning.

It also appears that a large number of the soldiers of the Third Division halted, by order of General Schurz, the Bullock Road, north of the Plank Road, and protected for several hours that approach to the rear of the Chance House. Beside these, there were several hundred of the Eleventh Corps men halted behind the batteries at Fairview, where some of them remained during the night. These positions were taken before Berry's Division reached the position taken by it, about four hundred yards in advance of the Federal cannon and on the Plank Road. The attack on the Eleventh Corps at Von Gilsa's position commenced at 5.30 p. m., and ceased at 7 or 7.15, when the Federal troops retreated from the Buschbeck line, and then Jackson ordered his tired and disordered battalions to halt at and around Dowdall Tavern, two miles distant from the Chance House. The statements that Berry's Division of the Third Corps, and that Huntington's guns at Hazel Grove, had the victorious rebels, are erroneous; for no line of battle Jackson's army at the time, or during the night, approached within seven hundred to one thousand yards of Berry, dense woods intervening. And all the infantry that appeared in Pleasanton's front and in front of Huntington's guns a group of foragers from Dole's Brigade, who promptly

* Co. B-134th Regt. Va. Inf. was here, and did not
check out to the north and east
of W. Bull Run
1st Regt. Va. Inf.

Chancellor House and on Fairview was caused by and was largely composed of the troops of other corps, who came from the southward and from Hazel Grove, where the Eleventh Corps had never been. In fact, the stragglers and wrecks of the Eleventh Corps had reached the rear or vicinity of the Chancellor House some time before these stragglers took place. And at the time of the panic, the regiments and fragments of the crushed corps were then actually in line of battle behind Digger's guns and the Federal batteries on Fairview, or with Buschbeck's Brigade in front of the batteries or in position on the Bullock Road, nearly a third of a mile north of the Plank Road, while Barlow's Brigade of nearly three thousand men of the Eleventh Corps were three or four miles south in the woods, searching for the enemy and for Birney's Division of Sickles' Corps, and unconscious of the disasters that had taken place in their rear. The abundant abuse heaped upon the members of the corps of a German name or descent does not appear to be at all justified by fact, and it can be shown that with few exceptions they fought as well as many other troops fought under similar conditions, and that the typical German organization known as Buschbeck's Brigade acted with great firmness, and treated in perfect order in the face of the victorious enemy. The investigation clearly proves that the disastrous results of the battle of Chancellorsville cannot be justly attributed to the want of vigilance and soldierly conduct on the part of the rank and file of the Eleventh Corps. Furthermore, we may properly say that these unjust imputations and imprecations, which have been scattered far and wide over the land for the last thirty years, blighting the honor and embittering the life of ten thousand deserving soldiers, ought to have been righted long ago, and would have been if some of the West Point officers in command in the Army of the Potomac had shown common fairness, or if the War Department had ordered an impartial investigation, which was earnestly asked for by some of the officers of the corps.

Conclusion

It would be a command of the right
 thing was not done in that day's fight.
 Howard, McLean, and Deorn, and
 have been criticized April 11

ing in front to the right flank of the Federal army. Colonel Lee these scouts to Devens and McLean, and insisted that some action should be taken, but was rebuked. After this event more scouts were sent and brought back the information that a large body of the enemy on our right flank, and apparently resting on their arms. Captain who was attached to the staff of General McLean, states that there is proof on record that any attempt was made to ascertain the truth falsity of the reports sent in from the picket line, and he doubts if of them ever reached the headquarters of the corps.

Surgeon Robert Hubbard, of the Seventeenth Connecticut, a man distinction and of strict integrity, was present at the Talley House, some times called the Hatch House, for several hours after noon, and given the compiler much information of what occurred there during the time. He was present both times when Colonel Lee came to inform Devens of the massing of the enemy on his flank. The second time came he brought a farmer and several scouts, who informed Devens the rebels were advancing, but Devens refused to believe it, and said Colonel Lee with decided emphasis, "You are frightened, sir!" Devens was at the time lying down on his back on a sofa nursing his leg, which had been injured by his horse running into a tree the day before. Surgeon Hubbard left the house, and had crossed the road to the north side, one of the first cannon balls fired by the enemy struck the ground between him and the Talley House. Devens, according to Hubbard's statement, was then lying on the sofa in the farm house, and there other evidence to show that this statement is correct.

NOTE NO. 8.

Further Warnings.

The warnings given at various times to the higher officers of the corps were numerous. Lieutenant Colonel Carmichael, of the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, stated in writing in June that he and Colonel Lockman went on picket the night before the attack, heard Jackson's preparations, and went to corps headquarters and gave information, and received as reply: "You are new troops, and more frightened than hurt." Major Schleiter, of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, was ordered to reconnoitre at three p. m., and soon returned with the information that the enemy was massed for an attack, and was sent by General Schurz to report the same to Howard. He did so his staff, and was told not to be alarmed. Schleiter heard the order of the rebel officers as they massed their lines of battle, and in 1862 published an account of it in the *National Tribune*. Colonel Richardson, of the Twenty-fifth Ohio, brought in four scouts, and reported Devens that the enemy was massing heavily a mile distant on the

Y fired into them without warning, the whole
 and animals broke into utter confusion and pan-
 the vista toward Hazel Grove. Here the mass of
 I was largely increased by additions from the artil-
 lery in bivouac at this farm, and at a high rate
 to the northeast. As the terrified mass of men,
 all tore through the ravine leading to Fairview, it
 name and energy by the men escaping from the
 us' Division, and also by many members of the Twel-
 returning from their support of Sickles near the R-
 ports of the battle at this hour, much can be found
 sition of this interesting movement, and also to pro-
 : berated Eleventh Corps were in it.
 : of the First Brigade of the Twelfth Corps, says (V)
 at as he emerged from the swamp to approach his
 : the Eleventh Corps falling back in disorder. I
 had fallen back to the rear some time before, most
 r previously, and none of them did he meet at this pl-
 further says: "A number of my men became mit-
 ng troops, and were unable to join their comrades un-
 cer to bring them forward." Colonel Quincy, of
 assets, of the Third Brigade, Twelfth Corps, says (p. 77)
 n and panic at this point. "The Thirteenth New J-
 brigade, broke and joined the rabble. Colonel Div-
 dred and Seventh New York, of the same brigade
 his regiment was also broken in fragments. A por-
 rallied with the Twenty-seventh Indiana, and also
 One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, of the Thir-
 I left Hazel Grove at a high rate of speed, also came
 with Indiana without a field officer, and stayed under
 nel Cosgrove all night. There are many reports in
 Corps and Twelfth Corps and the cavalry under P-
 brought to light, would clear up some of the obscur-
 eddaddle from Hazel Grove up the ravine to Fair-
 doubtless add to the proof that the Eleventh Corps
 out that the procession was composed almost entire-
 ly of men and material of others corps.

NOTES NO. 15.

Major Huntington's Views.

a letter from Maj. J. R. Huntington, who commands
 eries at Hazel Grove, May 2, 1863:

Huntington also stated in 1880, in the public press, that his
 were ready for action before the enemy fired a shot, and con-
 the assertion of General Pleasanton, he says that "A more im-
 and unfounded claim was never made."

J. R. HUNTINGTON.

Yours truly and fraternally,
 some fairly imbedded in history.
 to fight battles than it is to dig out lies about them after they
 Division Chief of Artillery, Truly,
 under the direction of a humble captain of artillery, as it hap-
 within a few yards of the spot where they had previously been
 and aligned by a distinguished cavalry general, were put
 morning; that the guns at Hazel Grove, instead of having
 by General Pleasanton, he was ignorant that a charge had been
 upon the defense of Bunker Hill. That so far from having been
 had no more bearing upon the defense of that position than
 Pennsylvania was made far out of sight and hearing of Hazel
 do the real facts seem! The fact is that the charge of the
 results. After this growing description, how tame and com-
 charge of a small regiment of cavalry that produced such stu-
 The pages of history will be searched in vain for the record of
 degrading of the establishment of slavery in the Northern
 This saving the army from destruction, and the country from the
 mile from the spot in question. General Doubleday goes on to
 on of the death of an officer who was killed by a musket ball
 impaled on the bayonets of the enemy." That is a poetical
 Chanellorsville and Gettysburg, fell Maj. Peter Keenan,
 There, as we are told by General Doubleday in his
 into a dense wood where were the "seething ranks of a
 change that may well be called desperate, for it involved scaling
 had previously ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry to
 that extraordinary order. To enable them to do so, General
 ceased, the panic stricken cannoniers, gaining fresh courage,
 in a voice of thunder: "Align those pieces!" Instantly the
 Pleasanton appeared "Deus ex machina," and, as one version
 :vers cutting their traces, and all that sort of thing. When
 the approach of the enemy the artillery then fled in wild dis-
 will accept as gospel the apocrypha of Pleasanton, to the effect
 public. There are those who, regarding the affair at Hazel
 to remove that groundless impression from the minds of the
 believe that Colonel Hamlin, in his forthcoming history, will
 of the Army of the Potomac was largely due to that fact.
 without offering any resistance worth mentioning, and that
 no believe that the right wing gave way before Jackson's
 among those who think themselves pretty well up in war
 Hazel Grove, on Saturday evening. I presume there are
 rps on the right, and, also, in a smaller way, that of the
 presented, to use a mild term, than has the behavior of the
 occurrence of the war has been more utterly and persist-
 the battle of Chanellorsville, allow me to say that in my

The following is further evidence
 I know their own country as far as
 J. M. Brown

Jackson's much larger army, to the lesser and meaner one of Steuart's Third Corps' beer. After the battle, there was no one in authority found brave enough, generous enough, or just enough, to say a word in justice or in kindness concerning the corps, and since that time two of the high officers of the Army of the Potomac—Couch and Doubleday—have dared to speak a word kindly and openly in its favor. Howard, at the midnight conference held by Hooker and his confidants on Sunday night, stated to the conference that "the situation was due to the bad conduct of his corps, or words to that effect," according to the report of the meeting as given by General Couch. This unfortunate and unjust remark was accepted by Hooker and repeated by him at the hearing before the Committee on the Conduct of the War two years afterwards, and it has since been accepted far and wide as official statement. It now appears that the fault lay not with the corps, but in the fault of the position, for which the rank and file of the corps are not in the least responsible. Eminent officers of Jackson's Corps freely state to-day that they did not consider that the corps was wrecked from any fault of its own, but from the inexcusable fault of its position in which the bravest troops in the world could not have resisted, without certain destruction, longer than did the Eleventh Corps. The same fact that it took Jackson's men one hour and a half to march one mile and a quarter after the attack began, is positive evidence of serious resistance. Longstreet's column of assault at Gettysburg, under Pettigrew and Pickett, numbering quite fifteen thousand men, marched the same distance and was wrecked in thirty minutes.

The loss of the campaign was due to some cause, and that cause has been generally assigned to the want of resistance of the Eleventh Corps. Howard, its commander, so stated in the midnight conference, and Hooker repeated the statement in his report to Congress. Since then it has been spread broadcast over the world, to the detriment of the unfortunate corps. There surely was a cause for the defeat of an army by another army of greatly inferior strength. There was a cause and a responsibility for the disaster, and as the French historian says: "Responsibility cannot exist without a name."

Hooker, it seems, was anxious to have Howard take command of the corps, and in his letter to Stanton he plainly shows the reasons why he does so. It is chiefly the desire to get rid of Schurz, then temporary command. And it is not hazardous much of an opinion saying that the letter, hatched in a spirit of dislike, was the cause of much disappointment and disgust. Hooker had a dislike of the corps, but why is not known. The men of the corps were fond of him, and freely filled him up with their best vitages when he made them a visit, but he disliked the corps nevertheless. Sickles said he did to Congress and there is other proof. The look of sardonic disdain which he when he said to Howard: "I give you the Eleventh Corps, which"

